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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey,' the Tenth Circuit decided
only three cases dealing with the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)2 or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 3 All three cases involved allega-
tions of violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 4 and rule lOb-5.5 Also
considered in these three cases were sections 17(a) of the 1933 Act 6 and
7(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 7 regulation T,8 rule 17a-3, 9 and the federal Admin-
istrative Procedures Act.' 0
Although no startling concepts were introduced by the Tenth Circuit in
these cases, they may be of interest as illustrations of this Circuit's applica-
tion of principles previously discussed and accepted by this or other circuits.
I. WHERE CLAIMS ARE MADE UNDER THE 1933 ACT AND 1934 ACT BY
A BROKER'S CUSTOMERS, AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE ARE
NOT ENFORCEABLE
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore,' Mr. and Mrs.
Moore originally had alleged in state court negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, and violation of rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange by Merrill Lynch.' 2 After Mer-
rill Lynch removed the case to United States District Court as a diversity
action, the Moores alleged violation of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 13 sec-
tion 10(b) of the 1934 Act,' 4 and rule lOb-5.' 5 The Moores had signed
agreements which contained clauses agreeing to arbitrate; Merrill Lynch
won an order to arbitrate before the NASD in the district court and the
Moores appealed.16 The court discussed at length the decision in and policy
behind WIlko v. Swan,' 7 the leading case to deny enforcement of agreements
1. This survey covers cases in which opinions were filed from September 1, 1978 to May
31, 1979.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ii (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 17q(a) (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(c)(1) (1976).
8. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1978).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1978).
10. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
I1. 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978).
12. Id. at 824.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). This action only concerned the agreement to arbitrate;
therefore, Judge Doyle in this opinion did not address his position that there are no implied
civil remedies under § 17(a). Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.
1964).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
16. 590 F.2d at 825; see note 28 infra.
17. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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to arbitrate under the federal securities laws. In Wilko, the Court had relied
upon the provisions in section 14 of the 1933 Act. 18 The Tenth Circuit,
relying on Wiko, also applied section 14 to void the arbitration agreements
and to obtain remedies under the 1933 Act in Moore. The 1933 Act disposi-
tion was limited to section 12(2) remedies, i.e., those which had been liti-
gated in WI1iko.' 9
The other questions, which had not been decided previously in this cir-
cuit and which were not as obvious as the application of the WI/ko rule to
claims under the 1933 Act, were whether the rule in Wiko applied to an
action brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and whether actions
brought under rule 10b-5 were subject to the Wiko rationale.
The court commented that the policy considerations did not differ for
remedies under either Act and that section 29(a) of the 1934 Act 20 is nearly
identical to section 14 of the 1933 Act.21 It also explained that since section
29(a) expressly included rules and regulations within its ambit,22 the Wiko
holding would also apply to actions brought under section lOb-5.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the contention that Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co. 23 was applicable. 24 Following the lead of other circuits,2 5 the
court limited the holding of Scherk, which enforced agreements to arbitrate
under the 1934 Act, to only those situations where international agreements
are involved. The court concluded its opinion by emphasizing the impor-
tance of rule lOb-5 26 and its belief that placing it in an "inferior position" is
nonsensical.
2 7
The agreements signed by the Moores limited their choices of arbitra-
tion panels to those composed of stockbrokers. 28 Although the concern was
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77n reads in full as follows: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision bind-
ing any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
19. 590 F.2d at 827; see note 13 supra.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) reads as follows: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
21. See notes 18 and 20 supra.
22. See note 20 supra.
23. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
24. 590 F.2d at 829.
25. Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir.
1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1010 (1976); Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974).
26. "Rule lOb-5 is, after all, the most important remedy in both Acts." 590 F.2d at 829.
While it cannot be disputed that actions under rule lOb-5 may be the most numerous types of
actions brought under the securities laws, other provisions of the 1933 Act may be of greater
importance for plaintiffs for whom those actions are available. See, e.g., Section 17(a) of the 1933
Securities Act." An Alternative to the Recently Restrzcted Rule 1ob-5, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 340 (1977), for a
discussion of the advantages of actions under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act over those under rule
lOb-5, including the possibility of punitive damages and the availability of state courts as a
forum.
27. 590 F.2d at 829.
28. One agreement which the Moores signed contained the following clause:
Any controversy between us arising out of such option transactions or this agreement
shall be settled by arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Incorporated, or the New York Stock Exchange, or the American Stock Exchange,
only. I shall have the right of election as to which of the foregoing tribunals shall
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not articulated by the court in this opinion, the reluctance to force the reso-
lution of claims by investors against brokerage firms before a panel of stock-
brokers by this and other courts is understandable, especially where the
investor is unsophisticated.
29
II. EXAMPLES OF WHAT ARE NOT NONDISCLOSURE, MANIPULATION,
AND MISREPRESENTATION UNDER 10(B) AND 1OB-5
In Kin-Ark Corp. v. Boy/es, 30 a counterclaim was brought 3 ' alleging viola-
tion of section 10(b) 32 and rule lOb-5 33 in a stock-for-assets transaction.
34
A. Failure to Disclose
The first matter discussed in this case was an alleged illegal failure to
disclose that officers and directors of Kin-Ark had interests in investments
conduct the arbitration. Such election is to be by registered mail, addressed to Merrill
Lynch's head office .... postmarked within five days after the date of demand to
make such election. At the expiration of the five days I hereby authorize Merrill
Lynch to make such election on my behalf.
590 F.2d at 825 n.2. The Moores also signed an agreement with the following clause:
It is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of your business or this agree-
ment, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of the Consti-
tution and Rules of the Board of Govenors of the New York Stock Exchange, except
however if the controversy involves any security or commodity or transaction or con-
tract relating thereto executed on an exchange located outside of the United States
then such controversy, at the election of either of us, shall be submitted to arbitration
conducted under the Constitution and rules of such exchange (and if neither of us so
elects, arbitration shall be conducted under the provisions of the Constitution and
Rules of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange). Arbitration must
be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued by service upon the
other of a written notice of intention to arbitrate, naming therein the arbitration tri-
bunal.
Id.
29. The district court had found the Moores to be unsophisticated "businessmen" and the
circuit court accepted this finding: 590 F.2d at 825 n.I.
Agreements to arbitrate may be enforced where there are agreements between: (1) mem-
bers of stock exchanges, Coenen v. R.W. Presspich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972); In re
Revenue Properties Litigation Cases, 451 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1971); or (2) a stock exchange mem-
ber and its former employee, Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp.
1084 (D. Pa. 1973); but see Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974). Also,
there may be exceptions where an agreement to arbitrate is made after the claim has matured,
as opposed to agreements made to arbitrate unknown controversies which may arise in the
future, because the investor has the opportunity to investigate any disadvantages to litigating
the particular claim under arbitration when compared to a judicial forum; compare Fox v.
Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609 (D. Md. 1975) with Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F.
Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); or where there is an intelligently negotiated agreement, Murtagh
v. University Computing Co., 490 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1974); Mittendorf v. J.R. Williston &
Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The standard agreements attempting to require investors to arbitrate before brokers have
been criticized other than in the courts. See Arbitrations of Investor-Broker Disputes, 66 CALtF. L.
REV. 120 (1977).
30. 593 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. Kin-Ark had sued for unpaid interest on a debt owed to Kin-Ark. One defendant
asserted that the note was usurious under Texas law; the circuit court agreed and imposed a
statutory penalty against Kin-Ark. 593 F.2d at 365.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
34. Kin-Ark purchased Boyles Galvanizing, Inc. All appellants were stockholders of the
company purchased by Kin-Ark which was then made a wholly owned subsidiary of Kin-Ark.
593 F.2d at 363-65.
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made by Kin-Ark 35 in a prospectus prepared for a public rights offering of
Kin-Ark stock shortly before Kin-Ark's purchase of the Boyles company.
The losing argument was that knowledge of management's interest in these
investments would have shaken confidence in "management's devotion to
the interests of its shareholders."'36 The court stressed the de minimis nature
of these investments to Kin-Ark in holding that there was no material omis-
sion 37 and therefore no violation. One investment constituted 0.72 percent
and the other 0.42 percent of Kin-Ark's total investments. 38 The valuations
appear not to have been computed for dates even close to one another in
time,39 and any test of the limits of materiality, at least in terms of a portion
of investments, is not determinable from this case because the total percent-
age of investments involved at the time the prospectus was issued, or at any
single time, is unknown. Indeed, the implication arises in this circuit by rea-
son of this case that the significance of an omission may be settled by using
the value of investments at the time they are purchased rather than at the
time a prospectus is issued for a public offering.
B. Manipulation of a Public Ofering
The next claim alleged manipulation of a public offering. Some holders
of long term debt in Kin-Ark accepted early payment and purchased Kin-
Ark stock at Kin-Ark's urging; Kin-Ark also redeemed convertible deben-
tures at a discount price and holders of the debentures purchased the same
amount of stock they would have been able to purchase if the debentures
35. Kin-Ark purchased 10% of Antipodes Exploration, Inc. (Antipodes), and two members
of Kin-Ark's management owned a total of 13.5% of Antipodes. Kin-Ark also acquired a 50%
interest in oil and gas leases in ajoint venture with T.L.M., Inc. (T.L.M.), of which Kin-Ark's
directors owned 12.5%. Id. at 366.
36. Id.
37. See Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule Iob-5?, 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 243 (1973). It is possible that this could be considered material. One of the tests of mate-
riality which has been used is whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the
nondisclosed item. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). The court in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) would not accept a test of materiality
which was based solely on its relationship to earnings (but the court did state that the test must
be conservative in order to limit meritless litigation). That a potential investor would attach
importance to the shared investments of the corporation and its management, even though they
are presently a small part of the corporation's investment, could be construed as reasonable;
though it may not directly relate to present earnings it could give the investor a persuasive
criterion for evaluating possible future handling of the corporation's affairs. Seegeneraly Steven-
son, The New Disclosure, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 50, 72-82 (1976), for a discussion of the effective-
ness of disclosure on management's conduct and reasons for requiring disclosure in the context
of proposed rules and noneconomic standards of materiality. See also Kripke, Rule lob-5 L'abiAq
and "Material" "Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1971), for a criticism of common tests of mate-
riality which have been used, especially when phrased in terms of percentages.
38. The Antipodes investment was 0.72% of Kin-Ark's investment when it was made, and
that acquisition date is not specified by Judge Breitenstein in this opinion, while the T.L.M.
investment accounted for 0.42% of Kin-Ark's total investments in July 1969, the month the
public offering had commenced. At the time of the Antipodes investment, Kin-Ark's total in-
vestments were $5,564,845 while in July 1969 they totalled 510,653,773. 593 F.2d at 366.
The court did not discuss whether the Antipodes investment had appreciated or depreci-
ated by the date of the 1969 public offering nor did it offer any clue as to what percentage of
Kin-Ark's total investments the Antipodes investment later constituted.
39. In July 1969 Kin-Ark's total investments were almost double what they had been when
the Antipodes interest was purchased. See note 38 supra.
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had been converted at maturity at their normal rate.4° The court relied
upon two grounds for its holding that no rule lOb-5 violations occurred: (1)
the closing agreement signed by all parties recited the fact that the closing
was contingent upon sale of a required number of shares of stock and thus
there were no grounds for complaint when a sale of stock was made; and (2)
Kin-Ark had exercised "sound business judgment" in paying its debts and
selling the required minimum number of shares of stock. 4 ' The court also




Finally, the court dismissed an allegation of misrepresentation of
financial condition. Kin-Ark had not included in its prospectus a two-year-
old unfavorable real estate analysis of two investments; it did include a
"bleak and discouraging account," the large operating losses, and an ac-
countant's report which was qualified by reason of these investments. The
court emphasized the lack of alteration of the total mix of information which
the real estate analysis would have added.
43
III. SANCTIONS AGAINST BROKER-DEALERS
In Mawod v. SEC,4 4 Mawod, individually, and his firm, Edward J.
Mawod and Company, unsuccessfully sought to overturn the order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which had revoked the firm's
registration as a broker-dealer and suspended Mawod from association with
any broker-dealer for one year.
4 5
The action originated over trading in a real estate corporation which
was substantially underfunded and the stock of which was publicly traded
after a Regulation A exemption had been filed. 46 Of 187,000 shares sold
during the initial offering, a total of 159,000 were sold to a friend of the
corporation's financial advisor, the president of the underwriter, and another
principal and trader. Although trading was inactive after the initial offer-
ing, a merger was arranged, to be pursued by one Strand. Mawod previ-
ously had prevented Strand from trading at his firm, but he permitted
Strand to use the firm's premises and facilities to trade this stock in a nomi-
nee account, although he asked someone to watch Strand. Another individ-
ual, O'Quinn, worked with Strand.47 O'Quinn and Strand created a market
for the stock through wash sales, matched orders, 4 3 and sales above the bid
40. 593 F.2d at 366-67.
41. Id. at 367. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. ii. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir. 1973), for another example of deference to the business judgment where claims were
made under the federal securities laws.
42. 593 F.2d at 367.
43. Id.; see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Hassig v. Pearson, 565
F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1977).
44. 591 F.2d 588 (1979).
45. Id. at 590.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 590-91.
48. The SEC defined wash sale as "one in which the ownership of the security remains
1980]
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and ask price. Later, fearing an inability to pay on the part of O'Quinn and
Strand, Mawod terminated the account and the prices for the stock then
fell.49
The SEC determined that the corporation was a shell which ordinarily
would not have had a market and that the matched trades and wash sales
were manipulative. Mawod and his firm were found by the court to have
aided and abetted the manipulation, which violated section 17(a) of the
1933 Act,50 section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,51 and rule lOb-5. 52 The court also
agreed that section 7(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 53 regulation T, 54 and rule
17a-3 55 had been violated.
A. Regulation n6- and Rule 17a-3
Mawod argued that the O'Quinn account was a C.O.D. account
5 7
which permits thirty-five days instead of seven days for payments under
regulation T, but the court noted that Mawod and Company's policy for
years had been to make clear to their customers that C.O.D. accounts were
not available to any customers. 58 In its finding of a regulation T violation,
the court observed also that there was no evidence that Mawod was author-
ized to use credit balances in the O'Quinn-Strand account to cover stock
purchases.
59
The circuit court agreed with the SEC that Mawod and Company vio-
unchanged" and a matched order as "one placed with the knowledge that an offsetting order
had already been or is about to be placed." These are prohibited by section 9(a)(1) of the 1934
Act. 12 SEC DOCKET 363, 366 (1977). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.25
(1976), for a similar definition by the Supreme Court.
49. 591 F.2d at 591.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1976).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(1) (1976).
54. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.8 (1978).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (1978).
56. Regulation T is one of the regulations promulgated by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System under section 7 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976), controlling
margin requirements for credit on securities. It is enforced by the SEC and applies to every
broker-dealer. N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS
AND SECURITIES MARKETS 9.01-.03 (1977).
57. These are governed by 4(c)(5) of regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(5) (1978). For a
description of the types of accounts included under the control of regulation T, see Credit Regula-
tion in the Secunties Market.- An Analysu of Regulation T, 62 Nw. L. REV. 587 (1967).
58. 591 F.2d at 594. The court did not address the SEC finding that regulation T requires
prompt payment upon delivery within the 35 day maximum and is only applicable where the
mechanics of trade, and not the customer's willingness to pay, prevent earlier delivery. 12 SEC
DOCKET 363 (1977). In the past the SEC has only permitted transactions in a C.O.D. account
where the broker could show that mechanics of trade prevented earlier delivery by the broker.
In re John W. Yeaman, Inc., 42 SEC 500 (1965); In re Madison Management Corp., 42 SEC 390
(1964); In re Palombi Sec. Co., 41 SEC 266 (1962); In re Coburn & Middlebrook, Inc., 37 SEC
583 (1957).
The court dismissed arguments over the existence of credit balances in the account at vari-
ous times with the statement that whether a credit balance existed or not was irrelevant since
there was no authorization to use it. 591 F.2d at 593-94.
59. One court has found no duty for a broker-dealer to obtain a written margin agreement
where the customer understands the elements of that type of transaction. Bell v. J.D. Wine &
Co., 392 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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lated rule 17a-3(a)(9) under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act when it did not
enter in its records Strand's interest in O'Quinn's account. The court said
that control over an account is not the test. It noted, however, as persuasive
to show a violation had occurred the fact that Strand had admitted exercis-
ing some control over the account, along with the fact that checks were
made out by Mawod to Strand for the O'Quinn account, and that Mawod
was otherwise aware of the Strand-O'Quinn relationship.
B. Man'pulations
Mawod and his firm did not dispute that manipulation of the market
had occurred; they pleaded lack of knowledge of the cause. 6° The court
recited some of the facts and said it found sufficient evidence6 ' to support
the charge of aiding and abetting the manipulation. 62 (Matched orders and
wash sales are per se manipulation.) 63 The court also indicated its respect
for SEC "insight" and its reluctance to disturb SEC findings. Respect for
the SEC, which may have been a most persuasive factor,64 permitted omis-
sion of a lengthy analysis of the facts in this portion of the court's discussion.
C. Scienter
The court next dealt with the applicability of scienter. 6 5 The Supreme
Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder66 specifically left open the questions of
whether scienter6 7 applied to SEC actions for injunctions and whether reck-
lessness6 8 sufficed as scienter under securities laws provisions.69  The
60. 591 F.2d at 595. See Rule Iob-5 Liability Afer Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding
and Abetting, 45 U. CHi. L. REV. 218, 231-42 (1977) for a discussion of the knowledge necessary
for a violation.
61. The standard for support of an agency decision is substantial evidence under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77i of the 1933 Act and 15 U.S.C. § 78y of the 1934
Act, according to the Tenth Circuit, 591 F.2d at 593, although 15 U.S.C. § 77i does not use the
term "substantial."
62. The court does not address the SEC's discussion that deception is a violation as manip-
ulation even if no one in the market is damaged. 12 SEC DOCKET at 367-68. Creating the false
impression of market activity is manipulative. Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F.
Supp. 1349 (D. Tex. 1979). The Tenth Circuit did not set out the elements of aiding and
abetting but stated that knowledge and substantial assistance are necessary. In SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), the court set out these tests: (1)
another person has committed a securities violation; (2) the alleged aider and abettor has a
general awareness that his role is improper; and (3) substantial assistance of the violation. See
also 45 U. CHi. L. REV. at 225-42, supra note 60.
63. 591 F.2d at 595.
64. Other courts have indicated their respect for SEC opinions: SEC v. Parklane Hosiery,
558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (SEC receives benefit of all reasonable doubt); Rolf v. Blyth East-
man Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (SEC receives deference and its judgment
receives great weight).
65. 591 F.2d at 595-97.
66. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
67. The Supreme Court defined scienter as a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud. Id. at 194 n.12.
68. The Supreme Court referred to recklessness only as a "form of intentional conduct."
Id. Recklessness has been defined as "carelessness approaching indifference" and "closer to
being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence." Hoffman v.
Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978).
69. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
1980]
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Supreme Court also specifically reserved any judgment on the elements of
aiding and abetting in Hochfelder.70 The unresolved questions of Hochfelder
have resulted in a great deal of commentary 71 and the court in Mawod dis-
cussed Hochfelder,72 but it did not discuss clearly why it felt Hochfelder ap-
plied. Mawod involved administrative sanctions by the SEC over broker-
dealers and associates of broker-dealers 73 and aiding and abetting viola-
tions.74 The references by the court to injunctive actions and to Hochfelder's
applicability are confusing 75 because Hochfelder is clearly limited to private
causes of action for damages, 76 and does not apply directly to SEC adminis-
trative enforcement actions.
The court noted that Hochfelder did "not express a view as to a public
action such as this one" 7 7 but said that since the SEC had assumed that
Hochfelder applied,7 8 the court would also so assume. 79 An additional factor
which was not discussed in Mawod was that the statutoiy standard in a disci-
plinary action by the SEC is "willful" '80 which itself has had court interpre-
70. Id. at 191-92 n.7.
71. Eg., Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977) (predicting the inclusion of recklessness within
scienter); Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions under Section 10(b) and Rule
/0o-5" A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978) (noting that although courts state differ-
ent standards, injunctions are not being issued without a finding of scienter); The Scienter Require-
ments in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 419 (1977) (arguing in favor of a negligence standard in injunctive proceedings); New Light
on an Old Debate. Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 759
(1977) (arguing against a negligence standard in injunctive proceedings).
72. 591 F.2d at 595-97.
73. The SEC has these powers under § 15(b)(4), (6) and 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976),
where there are willful violations or willful aiding and abetting in the violation of any of the
federal securities laws.
74. 591 F.2d at 590, 593.
75. Judge Doyle in the Mawod opinion stated that
[t]he cases are not in full accord on applicability of Hochfelder to a case such as this.
The prevailing rule would appear to be that willful or reckless behavior satisfies the
scienter requirement. SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Sanders v. John
Nuveen & o., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314
(6th Cir. 1974); Comment, Scrinter and SEClInjunctive Suis, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1018,
1025 (1977).
591 F.2d at 596. The law review article cited Coven, Cofe, and SEC v. American Realty Trust,
586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978); it in turn was cited by the Tenth Circuit but as authority that no
scienter is necessary under § 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 591 F.2d at 596. These cases all concern
whether scienter is necessary in injunctive actions. Sanders, a class action, defined recklessness
conservatively and said that it "can be sufficient to constitute scienter." The Sanders discussion
may be considered dictum since the court found only negligence on the part of the defendant,
not recklessness. None of the cases cited above by the court dealt with SEC disciplinary pro-
ceedings.
76. "We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether a private cause of action for
damages will lie under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'
.425 U.S. at 193. See also text accompanying note 68 supra.
77. 591 F.2d at 596.
78. The SEC said that Mawod acted with recklessness and referred to Hochfelder in a foot-
note with the signal "Cf," SEC DOCKET at 371 n.50, which indicates that it "supports a prop-
osition direntfrom that in the text but sufficiently analogous to lend support." A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION 7 (Harv. L. Rev. Ass'n pub. 1976 (emphasis added)). Arguably the SEC
did not assume that Hochfelder applied but only strengthened its argument by an analogy in
what it considered an egregious case. See note 89 in/ia. Perhaps this is another example of the
courts' deference to the SEC. See note 68 supra.
79. 591 F.2d at 596.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976). See note 73 supra.
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tations differing from the Hochfelder standard."'
Other courts have discussed these issues directly. In Colns Security Corp.
v. SEC,8 2 the court recognized that the reasoning of Hochfelder, but not its
direct holding, may be applicable to SEC disciplinary proceedings against a
broker-dealer.8 3 Judge Friendly in Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SECa4 discussed the
difference between the "willful" standard as it had been applied by the SEC,
i.e., intentionally committing an act without proof of evil motive, and the
Hochfelder standard, ite., proof of intention to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud. He did not decide whether HocAfe/der applied to disciplinary proceed-
ings, although he noted the similarity between disciplinary proceedings and
private actions because both apply to past conduct. He distinguished in-
junctive proceedings from SEC enforcement sanctions because injunctive
proceedings deal with the threat of harmful future conduct,8 5 although both
injunctions and disciplinary actions are public actions.
The court in Mawod equated knowledge with willfulness and brought
willfulness within the Hochfelder scienter requirement of the 1934 Act, with-
out specifying that it was doing so, in order to bring enforcement proceed-
ings by the SEC within the scope of Hochfelder. References in the opinion to
cases and a comment dealing with injunctive proceedings, 86 without any ref-
erences to or discussion of enforcement proceedings or the policies behind
having the same or differing standards for cases brought for broker discipline
rather than for damages or injunctions, make it difficult to determine
whether the court intended one or both of the SEC injunctions and adminis-
trative enforcement actions to meet Hochfelder standards to be successful in
the Tenth Circuit.
In addition, the guidance as to recklessness meeting the scienter require-
ment is vague. The court did not define recklessness but it did define willful-
ness, and then stated that willfulness exists where reckless indifference
exists.8 7 Since the defendants in this case were found to be willful and there-
fore liable under the 1934 Act, by backtracking through the reasoning of the
court it appears that recklessness88 will support a violation of the 1934 Act in
this circuit in any type of action, tie., one for damages, one seeking an injunc-
tion, and one for disciplinary purposes.
8 9
The court discussed the arguments against requiring scienter under sec-
tion 17(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. It then simply stated it agreed with the SEC
ruling that Mawod acted recklessly and that that was in accord with
81. N. WOLFSON, note 56 supra, at $ 2.01.
82. 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
83. Id. at 826-27.
84. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 180-81 n.6. See also 77 COLUM. L. REV. at 433, 439, supra note 71, for comments
on differing treatments of scienter for injunctive and disciplinary actions.
86. See note 75 supra.
87. 591 F.2d at 596.
88. See note 68 supra.
89. Cf text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra. The SEC has taken the position that




Hochfelder,90 but it did not say why recklessness was in accord with Hochfelder
under the 1933 Act when the Hochfelder Court had specifically refused to rule
on whether scienter included recklessness.9 ' We are left with the questions:
Did the court refuse to adopt a scienter standard but still find that reckless-
ness was sufficient for a violation? Or did the court, after discussing the
arguments against requiring scienter and without giving any reasons for re-
jecting those arguments, decide that scienter is required and decide, again
without giving its reasons, that recklessness is included within scienter?
Margaret Lynn Toal-Rossi
90. 591 F.2d at 596-97.
91. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
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